Redistribution and fiscal policy by Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez
 
Working Paper Series 
 
 
Redistribution and Fiscal Policy 
 
Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez 
 






The author gratefully acknowledges Albert Marcet, Arantza Gorostiaga, and participants at several seminars for useful 
comments. The views expressed here are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta or 
the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the author’s responsibility. 
 
Please address questions regarding content to Juan F. Rubio-Ramirez, Economist and Assistant Policy Adviser, Research 
Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, GA 30309-4470, 404-498-8057, 
juan.rubio@atl.frb.org. 
 
The full text of Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working papers, including revised versions, is available on the Atlanta Fed’s 
Web site at http://www.frbatlanta.org. Click on the “Publications” link and then “Working Papers.” To receive notification 
about new papers, please use the on-line publications order form, or contact the Public Affairs Department, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309-4470, 404-498-8020. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 




Redistribution and Fiscal Policy 
 
 





Abstract: This paper studies the optimal behavior of a democratic government in its use of fiscal policies to 
redistribute income. I present a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents to 
analyze (1) the differences between the effects on the optimal tax rate of permanent and nonpermanent 
perturbations and (2) the relationship between initial inequality and both steady-state levy and income 
distribution. In addition, the optimal fiscal policy for the transition is calculated. The analysis leads me to three 
main conclusions. First, there are no important differences between how taxes respond to a permanent or 
nonpermanent perturbation. Second, the initial inequality has a huge effect on both actual levy and actual 
income distribution. And finally, the Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1992) result, i.e., taxes on labor are roughly 
constant over the business cycle, holds only if the productivity ratio is constant. In addition, the model implies a 
positive correlation between inequality and tax rate, just as in the basic literature. 
 
JEL classification: E62, E64 
 
Key words: optimal taxation, income distribution Redistribution and Fiscal Policy
1. Introduction
The main concern of this paper is to assess the optimal behavior of a democratic government
in its use of ﬁscal policies to redistribute income. This problem, and similar issues, has been
studied recently in the literature by Perotti(1993), Persson and Tabellini(1994), Krusell,
Rios-Rull and Quadrini(1997), and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999).
Perotti (1993) has used a non-overlapping generations model to study the eﬀects of income
distribution on growth when agents vote over the degree of redistribution and an externality
on human capital is the source of growth. Persson and Tabellini (1994) have used an over-
lapping generations model to study the same problem when the driving force of growth is
an externality in physical capital. Krusell, Rios-Rull and Quadrini(1997) and Krusell and
Rios-Rull (1999) have worked on the eﬀects of inequality on ﬁscal policies in a recursive
framework.
It is important to note that Perotti(1993) and Persson and Tabellini(1994) were interested
in the eﬀects of inequality on growth through the ﬁscal channel, while Krusell, Rios-Rull and
Quadrini(1997) and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999) studied the eﬀects of inequality on policies.
This paper follows the second approach.
One limitation of these models is that they only calculate the non-stochastic stationary
equilibrium. This restriction limits the analysis in, at least, two dimensions. It is not possible
to study the diﬀerence between the eﬀects of permanent and non-permanent perturbations.
In addition, the consequences of the initial conditions on both the steady-state and transition
policies cannot be analyzed.
Concerning the ﬁrst limitation, Hall (1988) has shown that permanent and non-permanent
shocks have very diﬀerent implications on the intertemporal substitution of consumption.
However, it remains unclear whether this result holds in an optimal taxation environment
with heterogenous agents.
Moreover, the study of convergence issues has become an important aspect of economic
theory. However, previous research in optimal distribution has ignored the eﬀects of initial
inequality on steady-state policies and income distribution.
In order to examine these eﬀects, this paper presents a stochastic dynamic equilibrium
model with heterogenous agents to analyze both the diﬀerences between the eﬀects of perma-
nent and non-permanent perturbations on the optimal tax rate and the relationship between
initial inequality and steady-state variables. In addition, the optimal ﬁscal policy for the
transition will be calculated.
1Model and Solution Method Description The environment is a stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium model with three agents: two inﬁnitely lived consumers with diﬀerent
skill levels and a government that maximizes the median voter utility1.W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
fraction of each consumer in the economy is constant over time and that the fraction of low
skill level households is bigger than the fraction of high skill level households. Consumers
make decisions over consumption and leisure, thus there is neither capital nor endogenous
growth. The government sets proportional income taxes and transfers, both equal between
consumers, and is able to borrow and lend in a complete markets environment. Technology
is linear and separable on agent’s labor. There is also a random shock that aﬀects consumer
skill level.
Two versions of the model will be presented. In the ﬁrst version, the perturbations will
aﬀect aggregate productivity in a classical RBC way; the skill ratio will be constant. This
version will be called the Symmetric Shock Model. In the second one, the shock will only
aﬀect the lower ratio skill level; the skill ratio will not be constant. This case will be labeled
as the Asymmetric Shock Model.
Since the identity of the median voter does not change over time and a full commitment
technology is assumed, a Ramsey problem in the Arrow-Debreu sense will be deﬁned. The
most numerous consumer will play the role of the planner and he/she will optimize overall
possible sequences of future variables.
Given the model and the deﬁnition of equilibrium, which is discussed later, it is not
possible to get a closed form solution for the diﬀerent policy functions. For this reason, We
will use a numerical method that will be described in the appendix.
Results The analysis of the stochastic equilibrium leads us to three main conclusions.
First, tax responses to both permanent and non-permanent perturbations are very similar.
Second, the initial skills inequality has a huge eﬀect on both actual levy and actual income
distribution. And ﬁnally, the Chari, Christiano, Kehoe (1992) result- i.e. taxes on labor are
roughly constant over the business cycle- holds only if the productivity ratio is constant. In
addition, the model implies positive correlation between inequality and tax rate, just as in
the basic literature.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l l o w s .S e c t i o n2p r e s e n t st h et w ov e r s i o n so ft h e
model. There we will deﬁne and characterize both the equilibrium and the Ramsey problem.
Section 3 presents the results, and Section 4 the ﬁnal remarks.
1We will see that we do not need to speak about the median voter, since we will assume one of the types
of consumers is majoritarian. However, I will call this one the median voter in order to compare our results
with Persson and Tabellini.
22. The Model
The rest of this section is as follows. First, we introduce the Symmetric Shock Model
and both the equilibrium and the Ramsey problem are deﬁned and characterized. Second,
t h es a m ei sd o n ef o rt h eAsymmetric Shock Model. Finally, we highlight the diﬀerences
between the two models.
2.1. The Symmetric Shock Model
We study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two types of households,
household type “h” and household type “l”, and a government that maximizes the utility
of the median voter. Household type h has measure γ and household type l has measure
1 − γ,w h e r eγ ∈ (0,0.5). This fact implies that a type l household is the median voter. We
consider and economy without capital and with a single ﬁnal good, yt, that is produced using
elastically suplied labor in the following way:
yt =( γ(1 − xh,t)φh +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φl)θt (1)
where (1 − xi,t) is the amount of labor supplied by a household of type i ∈ I ≡{ h,l}, θtφi is
its marginal product and θt is a aggregate productivity shock following a Markov process:






As the reader can observe, in this environment the aggregate productivity shocks, θt,h a v e
not eﬀect on the ratio between household type l and household h marginal products,
θtφl
θtφh.
This is why we call this set up the Symmetric Shock Model.
Households Consumers derive utility from consumption and leisure. The household’s type






where U is strictly increasing and concave on its two arguments. Consumer type i is endowed
with an unit of time which is devoted to work and leisure. Besides, the household can lent
to or borrow from other households or the government using a full array of contigent one




pt(θ)bi,t(θ)dθ =( 1− τt)ωi,t(1 − xi,t)+bi,t−1(θt)+Tt (3)
3taking as given θ0 and bi,−1.W h e r eci,t denotes the consumption level of the type i consumer
at t, ωi,t denotes the hourly wage rate of household type i at t, xi,t denotes leisure of household
type i at t, pt(θ) is the price at t of a bond that pays a unit of the ﬁnal good at t +1if
the aggregate productivity shock is θ, bi,t(θ) is the type i consumer demand at t for bonds
that pay a unit of the ﬁnal good at t +1if the aggregate productivity shock is θ, Tt is the
level of transfers ﬁxed by the government at t, τt is the level of labor taxes ﬁxed by the
government at t. In addtion, there are upper and lower bounds for bi,t large enough not to
bind in equilibrium but ﬁnite to avoid Ponzi games.
Government Government maximizes median voter’s utility, i.e. consumer’s of type l util-
ity, subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
Tt + bt−1 (θt)=τt(γ(1 − xh,t)ωh,t +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)ωl,t)+
 
pt(θ)bt(θ)dθ (4)
taking as given θ0 and b−1.W h e r ebt(θ) is the government demand at t for bonds that pay
a unit of the ﬁnal good at t +1if the aggregate productivity shock is θ. In addtion, there
are upper and lower bounds for bt large enough not to bind in equilibrium but ﬁnite to avoid
Ponzi games.
Market clearing conditions The clearing condition in the bond market is:
(1 − γ)bl,t(θ)+γbh,t(θ)=bt(θ) (5)
and this same condition for t = −1 implies that:
(1 − γ)bl,−1 + γbh,−1 = b−1 (6)
Since there is not capital, the ﬁnal good clearing market condition is:
(1 − γ)cl,t + γch,t = yt (7)
Therefore, given the production function (1) and the ﬁnal good clearing market condition
(7), we can write the economy resource constraint:
γch,t +( 1− γ)cl,t =( γ(1 − xh,t)φh +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φl)θt (8)
42.1.1. Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we ﬁrst describe which is the households’ problem and then deﬁne a competitive
equilibrium.
Household’s type i problem is to choose {ci,t,x i,t,b i,t (θ)} that maximizes the objective
function (2) subject to the sequence of budget constraints (3) and taking the sequence of
wages, taxes, transeferences, prices {ωi,t,τt,T t,p t(θ)}, the initial stock of bonds and shock





Pr(θt+1 = θ/θt) (9)
Ux,i,t
Uc,i,t
=( 1− τt)ωt (10)
where Uc,i,t and Ux,i,t are the marginal utilities with respect to consumption and labor respec-
tively.
In this envoirenment a competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium Deﬁnition). Given {θ0,b l,−1,b h,−1,b −1} such that
(6) holds, a competitive equilibrium is a process for allocations {(ci,t)i∈I ,(xi,t)i∈I ,(bi,t(θ))i∈I ,b t(θ)},





1. For each i ∈ I, {ci,t,x i,t,b i,t(θ)} maximizes household’s utility function (2) subject to
the budget constraint (3) given {τt,T t}, {pt(θ),ω i,t}, bi,−1 and θ0.
2. For each i ∈ I
ωi,t = φiθt (11)
3. The goverment budget constraint (4), the bonds market clearing condition (5) and
economy resource constraint (8) hold.
2.1.2. The Ramsey Problem
As mentioned before, government maximizes consumer of type l’s utility. The government is
aware of consumers answer to policy announcements and takes this reaction into account when
its solve its maximitation problem. This is what has been called a Ramsey problem. Hence,
the Ramsey problem consists on choosing taxes and transfers that maximize the utility of a
household type l over the set of competitive equilibriums deﬁned above. When doing so, the
government faces various trade-oﬀs. Consumers of type l derive utitlity from higher transfers
but those transfers has to be ﬁnance throught taxes or government debt. Taxes aﬀect both
consumers symmetrically and they distort labor supply decisions. Higher governmet debt
5today increases taxes tomorrow. Since the government solves an intertemporal problem it
will try to smooth taxes throught time and states of nature.
As widely noticed in the literature, this problem is not time consistent. To avoid dealing
with this issue, we assume that the government has some device such it can commit itself to
the Ramsey outcome.
Techinically the Ramsey problem consists of maximizing consumer of type l’s utility over
the set of competetive equilibria. This is equivalent to choose the allocations, taxes, transfers
and prices that maximizes consumer of type l’s utility over the set of allocations, taxes,
transfers and prices that deﬁne a competetive equilibria. In general this problem can be very
complicated. Thus, the next step it is to deﬁne the minimal set of equations that characterize
the set of allocations, taxes, transfers and prices that deﬁne a competetive equilibria. We do
this in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium Charaterization). Given {θ0,b l,−1,b h,−1,b −1}
such that (6) holds, if the equilibrium is interior and unique, then the equilibrium process for















• The next restriction is satisﬁed






(Φh,t − Φt) (14)
where







)(γ(1 − xh,t)φh +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φl)θt
• The economy resource constraint (8) holds.
Proof. The proof will be as follows. First, we are going to show that given a sequence
for consumption and leisure allocations for both types of consumers {(ci,t)i∈I ,(xi,t)i∈I} such
6that the resource constraint (8), the restrictions (12) and (13) and (14) hold for some λ,




such that consumers’ budget constraint (3) for ∀i ∈ I, the equilibrium wage
(11) for ∀i ∈ I, the government budget constraint (4), the bonds market clearing condition
(5), the resource constraint (8) and the households’ ﬁrst order conditions (9) and (10) ∀i ∈ I
hold.
At this point, it is important to notice that with concave utility function, and if the
equilibrium is interior and unique (as assumed), the solution to the maximization problem of
the consumer is uniquely determined by the consumer’s budget constraint (3) and the ﬁrst
order conditions (9) and (10), so that the consumer’s budget constraint (3) for ∀i ∈ I,t h e
equilibrium wage (11) for ∀i ∈ I, the government budget constraint (4), the bonds market
clearing condition (5), the resource constraint (8) and the households’ ﬁrst order conditions
(9) and (10) ∀i ∈ I are necessary and suﬃcient for competitive equilibrium.
Assume that {(ci,t)i∈I ,(xi,t)i∈I} and λ are such the resource constraint (8), the restrictions
(12) and (13) and (14) hold. Now, we are going to ﬁnd {pt(θ)}
∞
t=0 such that the ﬁrst order
condition (9) holds for ∀i ∈ I.










Pr(θt+1 = θ/θt) (15)
(which is (9) for i = l) then, (12) implies (9) for i = h.
Let us now probe that exists {τt}
∞


















= ωi,t (1 − τt)
























(Φh,t − Tt) (18)







(Φl,t − Tt) (19)









(Φh,t+j+1 − Tt+j+1) (20)









(Φl,t+j+1 − Tt+j+1) (21)









(Φt+j+1 − Tt+j+1) (22)
Notice that the three bonds demand deﬁnitions (20), (21) and (22) are such that bonds
market clearing condition (5) holds. Now, using the deﬁnition of prices (15) and taxes (16),

















for t ≥− 1, what it means that the household’s type h budget constraint (3) (the sequence
of budget constraints for consumer type h) holds. Using a similar procedure with (17) and
(19) we can show that the household’s type l budget constraint (3) for i = l (the sequence
of budget constraints for consumer type l) and the government budget constraint (4) (the
sequence of government budget constraints) also hold.
Second, we are going to probe that given a sequence for consumption, leisure and bonds




such that consumers’ budget constraint (3) for ∀i ∈ I, the equilibrium wage (11) for ∀i ∈ I,
8the government budget constraint (4), the bonds market clearing condition (5), the resource
constraint (8) and the households’ ﬁrst order conditions (9) and (10) ∀i ∈ I hold we can ﬁnd
a λ such that the restrictions (12), (13) and (14) hold.



















such that (12) holds.






that together with (12) imply (13).
Finally, using (9) and (11) for i = h in the consumer type h budget constraint (3) and in
















(τtθt(γ(1 − xh,t)φh +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φl) − Tt)
If we convine these two equations with (10) for i = h we get (14).
Proposition 1 implies two important features of a competitive equilibrium. First, if we
assume separable between consumption and leisure utility function, (12) and (13) imply that
both consumption and hours worked ratios between the two types of households are constant
through time and realizations of the productivity shock. Second, λ, and, consequently, the two
mentioned ratios, depend on the whole productivity shock sequence, and not only its actual
realization. As we will see in the numerical exercice to be presented in the next section,
this implies the intial conditions, i.e. θ0, b−1, bl,−1 and bh,−1, are going to very important
9on today’s households consumption and hours worked optimal choices and, therefore, on the
optimal ﬁscal policy.
But the most important implication of proposition 1 is the following: The economy re-
source constraint (8) and the restrictions (12), (13) and (14) are necesary and suﬃcient for
competitive equilibrium. Hence, for each sequence of {(ci,t)i∈I ,(xi,t)i∈I} and λ, such that (8)
and the restrictions (12), (13) and (14) hold, there exists allocations, taxes, transfers and
prices such that they deﬁne a competitive equilibria. Therefore, the Ramsey Problem will be
to choose {(ci,t)i∈I ,(xi,t)i∈I} and λ such that maximize type l consumer’s utility subject to
(8), (12), (13) and (14).






















γch,t +( 1− γ)cl,t =( γ(1 − xh,t)+( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φl)θt
where θ0, bh,−1 and b−1 are given.
At this point, we would like to remark that we are not aware of any paper that has charac-
terized and solved this problem in the way we have done here. Garcia-Milà et. al. (2001) have
a similar Ramsey problem but they do not solve for the optimal Ramsey allocation. Instead,
they calibrate λ to some data features. In what follows, ﬁrst we are going to solve for the
optimal Ramsey allocation. Then, we will perform some numerical exercices to understand
which are the main features of the optimal Ramsey allocation.











If this is the case, we can use the resource constraint (8), and the restrictions (12), (13) to




























































































This is going to be the most important object of study in this work. Now onwards, this
function will be referred to as the policy function.
At this point, it is important to note that the assumption of separability between con-
sumption and leisure decisions allows us to relate λ to the equilibrium income distribution.






Thus, if λ>1,h i g h e rλ implies more income inequality. From this point, λ will be referred
to as the income distribution parameter.















(Φh,t (ch,t,λ,θ t) − Φt(ch,t,λ,θ t)) (24)
where θ0, bh,−1 and b−1 are given.
If an optimal policy exists and it is interior, the optimal allocations must satisfy the
government’s ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ch,t and λ and the restriction (24).
Let η be the langrangian multiplier of (24). Then, the ﬁrst order conditions of the Ramsey


























































Thus, given the optimal λ and η, ch,t only depends on the contemporaneous shock θt and it
has the same correlation properties as the former.
Given (25), (26) and (24) the solution to the Ramsey problem can be written as:
η = η(φl,θ 0)
λ = λ(φl,θ0)
ch,t = ch(φl,θ t,θ 0)
2.2. The Asymmetric Shock Model
Now we are going to introduce some asymmetry in the way the aggregate productivity shock,
θt, aﬀects agents marginal productivity (or wage), ωi,t. In the model described in section 2.1
the ratio of hourly wages was not aﬀected by the aggregate productivity shock, θt.I n t h i s
new version of the model, the aggregate productivity shock, θt, only aﬀects type l consumer’s
marginal productivity (or wage), ωl,t, so it aﬀects the ratio of marginal productivities, or
wages. This is the reason why we call this set up the Asymmetric shock model.T h e
arising diﬀerences are:
1. The production function
yt = γ(1 − xh,t)φh +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φlθt (27)












pt(θ)bi,t(θ)dθ =( 1− τt)ωi,t(1 − xi,t)+bi,t−1(θt)+Tt (29)
12given bi,−1 and θ0.
3. Government’s restriction
Tt + bt−1(θt)=τt(γ(1 − xh,t)ωh,t +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)ωl,t)+
 
pt(θ)bt(θ)dθ (30)
4. The bonds market clearing conditions are as in the symmetric shock model.
5. The economy resource constraint
γch,t +( 1− γ)cl,t = γ(1 − xh,t)φh +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φlθt (31)
In this case a competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 2. Given {θ0,b l,−1,b h,−1,b −1} such that (6) holds, a competitive equilibrium is a






1. For each i ∈ I, {ci,t,x i,t,b i,t(θ)} maximizes household’s utility function (28) subject to
the budget constraint (29) given {τt,T t}, {pt(θ),ω i,t}, bi,−1 and θ0.
2. The equilibrium wages are as follows
ωl,t = φlθt
ωh,t = φh
3. The goverment budget constraint (30), the bonds market clearing condition (5) and the
economy resource constraint (31) hold.
Two are the main diﬀerences with the symmetric shock model. First, the equilibrium
wages. As noted, in the symmetric shock model, the productivity shock aﬀects both
households’ wages simmetrically. In the asymmetric shock model that is not the case
anymore and the productivity shock only aﬀects household’s l wage. Second, both the pro-
duction function (27) and the economy resource constraint (31) reﬂect this same fact, since
the productivity shock only aﬀects household’s l marginal productivity.
As before, we have to characterize the equilibrium. This is done in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 2. Given {θ0,b l,−1,b h,−1,b −1} such that (6) holds, if the equilibrium is interior















• The next restriction is satisﬁed















)(γ(1 − xh,t)φh +( 1− γ)(1 − xl,t)φlθt)
• The economy resource constraint (31) holds.
The equilibrium characterization is also diﬀerent from the symmetric case. The most
important diﬀerence is the follwoing: The ratio of marginal utility of leisure is not constant
anymore, Ux,l,tφh/(Ux,h,tφl)=λθt. Therefore, at least for the separable utility function used
in the numerical exercice that follows, while consumption ratio between the two types of
households is constant, hours worked does not need to be. When, θt is high hours worked by
households type l decreses with respect to those worked by households type h.











































In the following two subsections, the two versions of the model are used to analyze the
relationship between the skill ratio and both the tax rate and the income distribution.
Since closed form solutions are not available, we solve the models using numerical sim-
ulations. The parameter values choice we consider is very similar to that used in the
business cycle literature. For the symmetric model we use the following parameter val-
14ues (γ,β,σ,σε,ρ)=( 0 .35,0.95,2,0.1,0.9) 2.F o r t h e asymmetric model the choice is
(γ,β,σ,σε,ρ)=( 0 .35,0.95,2,0.01,0.99985). As the reader should notice the only diﬀerences
are in parameter values that describe the stochastic process. Those imply a less volatile
and more persistence process in the asymmetric model. This is because when studing the
asymmetric case we are mainly going to be interested on convergence issues, so business
cycle ﬂutuations are not going to be very important.
In section 3.1, we examine the connection between the skill ratio and the tax rate. First,
we solve for the optimal policy function of the symmetric model to answer the following
three questions:
• How are the skill ratio and the average tax rate related?
• Given the skill ratio, what is the eﬀect of the business cycle on the tax rate?
• Are the eﬀects of permanent and non-permanent shocks on the tax rate diﬀerent?
The main conclusions are:
• The lower the skill ratio, the higher the average levy.
• Chari, Christiano, Kehoe (1992) result- i.e. taxes on labor are roughly constant over
the business cycle- holds only if productivity ratio is constant.
• Permanent and non-permanent shocks eﬀects on ﬁscal policy are very alike.
• There is no ﬁscal convergence, even when the skill ratio does converge.
Second, we solve the for the optimal policy function of the asymmetric model to answer
the two following questions:
• Are the eﬀects of permanent and non-permanent shocks on the tax rate diﬀerent?
• Does the initial skill ratio aﬀect the actual optimal tax rate?
In the second subsection, 3.2, the analysis of the relation between the skill ratio and the
income distribution is performed. Hence, we attempt to respond to the following queries:
• How are the skill ratio and the income distribution related?
• Is the initial skill ratio signiﬁcant for the actual distribution?
2Our aim is to study optimal ﬁscal policy and so much to match the data. This is why we do not calibrate










Table 1: Average Tax Rate, as a Function of Consumer "l"’s Marginal Productivity
In this case, the answers are:
• The lower the skill ratio, the more unequal the income distribution.
• The lower the initial skill ratio, the more unequal the income distribution.
Just note that for the stochastic process we use a Markov Change with unconditional
mean equal to one. Let us use “s” as superindex for the symmetric model policy function
(1),a n d“ as” for the asymmetric one, (32).
3.1. The Skill Ratio and the Tax Rate
3.1.1. Inequality and The Average Tax Rate
Now the eﬀects of permanent changes in the skill ratio on the average optimal tax rate are
analyzed. To understand this relation, the average tax level of three identical economies
(except by productivity of type l consumer) are compared.
Using (23), this analysis can be formally written as the determination of:
E(τ
s(.,θt,1))
i.e. the unconditional mean of the tax level as a function of φl. Consider three economies
indexed by j ∈{ 1,2,3} and let τs(φ
j
l,θ t,1) be the policy function associated with economy
j where φ
1
l =0 .7, φ
2
l =0 .825 and φ
3
l =0 .95,w h e nθt occurs.
As shown in the table 1, the higher φl, the lower the tax. This is a classical result in the
literature.
3.1.2. Business Cycle and Fiscal Policy
Chari, Christiano, Kehoe (1992) examine optimal ﬁscal policy over the business cycle in the
case of homogenous agents. This new setup allows two extensions of their analysis. In the
ﬁrst place, it lets us repeat their exercise in the case of heterogenous agents, and secondly, it
permits an extension when the cycle aﬀects the skill ratio.
16First, we use the symmetric model to study the consequences of the business cycles on




Second, we exploit the asymmetric model to study how perturbations of the skill ratio
aﬀect the tax rate. In this case, the following function is analyzed
τ
as(φl,.,1) (34)
Note that the diﬀerence between the last two equations is the superindex.
Figure 1 plots both functions. As it can be seen, (33), does not have a very notable
upward slope, i.e. taxes are slightly procyclical. On the other hand, (34) has a very signiﬁcant
downward slope.
These two results brings us to the following conclusion: the Chari, Christiano, Kehoe
(1992) result- i.e. taxes on labor are roughly constant over the business cycle- holds only if
productivity ratio is constant. Thus, optimal tax rate should smooth distortions over time
only if the skill ratio does not change.
The intuition for the diﬀerences between (33) and (34) is as follows. Type l consumer sets
the ﬁscal policy. She gets half of the diﬀerence between type h consumer ’s taxes and her own.
As a result, she is going to increase the tax level until both type h and l marginal payments
are equal. In the symmetric case, shocks do not aﬀect the skill ratio; both type h and l
marginal payments are aﬀected in the same way, so taxes do not move. In the asymmetric
model, shocks do aﬀect the skill ratio; both type h and l marginal payments are aﬀected
asymmetrically, so taxes do move to compensate.
Permanent versus Non-permanent Shocks Now, we analyze whether there are dif-
ferences between tax policies facing permanent and non-permanent shocks. Consider the
following deﬁnitions of permanent and non-permanent perturbations environments:
Deﬁnition 3. A permanent perturbation environment holds if θt = θ0 ∀t.
Deﬁnition 4. A non-permanent perturbation environment holds if it is not permanent.
Let us use the subindex p for the case of permanent shock environment. Since the non-
permanent environment is the one used until now, we will not use any subindex. Thus, we






Note that the ﬁrst corresponds to a permanent shock and the second to a non-permanent
shock. The results are reported in ﬁgure 2. There is not much diﬀerence between these
two policy functions. As noted before, in the symmetric model perturbations correspond to
business cycle shocks. Thus, for perturbations in the range (0.8,1.2) both functions are very
similar, with diﬀerences of less than ±2% over the tax rate at the mean of the perturbation
(remember that the mean of the process is 1).






The results are reported in ﬁgure 3. The optimal policy functions for the asymmetric
model are also alike.
3.1.3. The Initial skill ratio and the actual tax rate: The Non-Fiscal Convergence.
Consider a set of economies that, starting with diﬀerent skill ratio levels, converge to the
same one. How does the initial skill ratio aﬀect the actual tax rate? In other words, is there
convergence on tax rate? The answer is no.





be the policy function associated with economy j and let θ
1
0 =0 .5, θ
2
0 =0 .7, θ
3




It is important to stress the following three points:
• Type h productivity is ﬁxed, and lower θ0 means lower initial type l productivity.
• Type l productivity grows over time (since θ
j
0 < 1 ∀j ∈{ 1,2,3,4}).
• Asymptotically, all economies converge to the same skill ratio.
The results are reported in ﬁgure 4. As we can see, the lower θ0, the higher the taxes.
Consequently, even assuming skill ratio convergence, there is not ﬁscal policy convergence.
Since complete markets are assumed, an intertemporal substitution of consumption ar-
gument can explain why the lower the initial inequality level, the higher the taxes in the







Table 2: Income Distribution Parameter as a Function of Consumer "l"’s Marginal Produc-
tivity
via long run taxes. The lower the initial skill level the higher taxes she needs tomorrow. In
addition, labor supply’s elasticity prevents an excessive increase in tomorrow’s taxes, so the
initial productivity gap across economies cannot be totally oﬀset.
3.2. The Skill Ratio and the Income Distribution
3.2.1. Inequality and income distribution
Now, the eﬀects of permanent changes in the skill ratio on income distribution are analyzed.





Table 2 reports the results for each j. Logically, the lower the skill ratio the higher λ since
that means higher inequality in consumption. This means that ﬁscal policy cannot totally
compensate for diﬀerences in skill level, even in the case that the poorest agent chooses the
taxes. This is because taxes are distortionary and labor supply is elastic.
3.2.2. The Initial skill ratio and the actual income distribution: The Non-income
distribution Convergence
Consider a set of economies that, starting with diﬀerent skill ratio levels, converge to the
same one. How does the initial skill ratio aﬀect the income distribution? In other words,
is there convergence on income distribution? The answer is also no. In other words, let us




We will use the same four economies used in 3.1.3. As we can see, the lower θ0, the higher
the taxes. Hence, although there is productivity ratio convergence, this does not apply to








Table 3: Income Distribution Parameter as a Function of Initial Inequality Level, in the
Asymmetric Shocks Model
The lower θ0,t h el o w e rλ.
As mentioned before, type l consumer determines tax policy. We assume complete mar-
kets, thus she can ﬁnance transfers today with taxes tomorrow. Thus, an intertemporal
substitution of consumption argument can explain why the lower the initial inequality level,
the higher the taxes in the long run. In addition, labor supply’s elasticity prevents an ex-
cessive increase in tomorrow’s taxes, so the initial productivity gap across economies cannot
be totally oﬀset. The last point shows the importance of elasticity of labor supply3 to get
non-convergence on income distribution.
4. Conclusion
Most of the papers on ﬁscal policy and income distribution only deﬁne and compute the
non-stochastic stationary equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is sometimes useful because,
together with some assumptions, it permits us to get closed forms solutions for the policy
functions (see Persson and Tabellini (1994)). On the other hand, the use of this equilibrium
concept limits the results in two dimensions: [1] it is not possible to study the diﬀerence
between the eﬀects of permanent and non-permanent perturbations; [2] the consequences of
the initial conditions on both the steady-state and transition policies cannot be analyzed.
This paper is an attempt to address these two issues. The main conclusions are as follows.
First, tax responses to both permanent and non-permanent perturbations are very similar.
Second, the initial skills inequality has a huge eﬀect on both actual levy and the actual income
distribution. And ﬁnally, the Chari, Christiano, Kehoe (1992) result- i.e. taxes on labor are
roughly constant over the business cycle- holds only if productivity ratio is constant.
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5.1. Numerical Algorithm
We am going to describe the method used for the symmetric model.
We need to solve (24), (25) and (26).
Step 1 Set θ0.
Step 2 Guess λ and η.
Step 3 Generate one realization, 5000 periods long, of the Markov Chain. Let
A =
 
θ0 θ1 θ2 ... θ4999
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2 ...   θ
1
20
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2
2 ...   θ
2
20
... ... ... ... ...
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100
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y1 y2 ... y2500
 
.L e tX1 =
 
θ0 θ2 ... θ2499
 











Using the standard OLS method, estimate the parameters of
Y = µ + β1X1 + β2X2 +  
Note that, given these estimations, we can write
Et(yt+1/θt)     µ +   β1θt +   β2θ
2
t
21Step 7 Repeat the last step for







Et(  yt+1/θt)     π +  ζ1θt +  ζ2θ
2
t
Step 8 Solve, using (25), ch(  θ
j
i,λ,η) f o re a c ho n eo f  θ
j
i ∈ B.
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20  π +  ζ1  θ
20







h o l d .I fi td o e sn o t ,c h o o s en e wλ and η, and go to step 2 Note that these two equations
are approximations to (24), and (26).
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Fig 2: Permanent vs. non permanent perturbation in symmetric modelPermanent perturbation    
Non−permanent perturbation



































Fig 4: Policy functions for different initial values of the shock in asymmetric model